Effectiveness of the individual riflemen in an infantry squad by Martin, Michael M. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2017-12
Effectiveness of the individual riflemen in an
infantry squad
Martin, Michael M.; Perez, Ernesto; Peterman, Marc D.
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56761
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.














Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL RIFLEMEN IN 




Michael M. Martin 
Ernesto Perez 
Marc D. Peterman 
 
December 2017 
Thesis Advisor:  Robert F. Mortlock 
Co-Advisor: Jesse Cunha 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2017 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL RIFLEMEN IN AN INFANTRY 
SQUAD 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Michael M. Martin, Ernesto Perez, and Marc D. Peterman 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 




9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Our research establishes a decision-making framework for use during the acquisition of the next 
individual combat rifle system. We utilize four possible courses of action to display the decision-making 
model. The four primary evaluation factors to optimize the squad are lethality, accuracy, mobility, and 
interoperability. The first part of the model is a value approach that normalizes these four different 
performance factors for system comparison. The second part of the model is a qualitative approach that 
examines other potential risk factors. We analyze, normalize, and weigh the performance factors for 
comparison of each course of action against programmatic, political, and international risks.  
Program risks focus on the cost, schedule, and performance of each potential course of action, while 
maintaining the best interest of our soldiers and American taxpayers. Political risks are uncertain based on 
the stakeholders involved within Congress and military’s leadership. International risks are primarily 
concerned with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The 5.56mm caliber is the NATO 
standard, and any adaptation of a new weapon and caliber may invoke criticism from our NATO allies. In 
the end, our research provides senior leaders with an initial recommendation for gaining overmatch 
capability against our peer and near-peer adversaries. 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
individual carbine, interim combat service rifle, squad designated marksman rifle, commercial-
off-the-shelf, commercial, government-off-the-shelf 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
83 
















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 iii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 




Michael M. Martin 
Major, United States Army 
B.A., University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 2003  
 
Ernesto Perez 
Major, United States Army 
B.A., Seton Hall University, 1994 
 
Marc D. Peterman 
Major, United States Army 
B.A., Capital University, 2006 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 

















Keith Snider, Ph.D. 
Academic Associate 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy  
 iv 




Our research establishes a decision-making framework for use during the 
acquisition of the next individual combat rifle system. We utilize four possible courses of 
action to display the decision-making model. The four primary evaluation factors to 
optimize the squad are lethality, accuracy, mobility, and interoperability. The first part of 
the model is a value approach that normalizes these four different performance factors for 
system comparison. The second part of the model is a qualitative approach that examines 
other potential risk factors. We analyze, normalize, and weigh the performance factors 
for comparison of each course of action against programmatic, political, and international 
risks.  
Program risks focus on the cost, schedule, and performance of each potential 
course of action, while maintaining the best interest of our soldiers and American 
taxpayers. Political risks are uncertain based on the stakeholders involved within 
Congress and military’s leadership. International risks are primarily concerned with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The 5.56mm caliber is the NATO standard, 
and any adaptation of a new weapon and caliber may invoke criticism from our NATO 
allies. In the end, our research provides senior leaders with an initial recommendation for 
gaining overmatch capability against our peer and near-peer adversaries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The infantry squad is a lethal, versatile, and capable warfighting organization. 
Wartime necessity gave birth to squad maneuver concepts unheard of before World War 
I, and transformed the infantry on the battlefield. The history of the modern United States 
(U.S.) Army infantry squad lies in the lessons learned by the German Stroβtruppen of 
WWI (Lupfer, 1981). German Storm Troopers were specially trained soldiers versed in 
siege warfare and the attack. Integration of multiple skillsets increased the versatility and 
effectiveness of the squad. No longer were riflemen only carrying rifles, and grenadiers’ 
only carrying grenades. Stroβtruppen were cross-trained on multiple weapon systems to 
increase their effectiveness and reduce their reliance on other units (Cardona, 2014).  
 The U.S. Army observed and recorded lessons learned from the German 
Stroβtruppen during WWI, and captured the effectiveness of these new combat units. The 
1946 Infantry Conference transitioned lessons learned into doctrine to shape the future 
fighting force (Doughty, 1979). Here the rifle squad was defined as “a group of enlisted 
men organized as a team,” and the “smallest tactical unit consisting of only as many men 
as a leader can direct easily on the field” (Department of the Army [DA], 1946). 
Although squad organization varied over time, the combat effectiveness of the squad 
remained central to the organizational plan (Karcher, 2002). 
The U.S. Army’s new doctrine required cross training infantry squads for combat 
in WWII. (Hughes, 1995). Squad weapons comprised of a mixture of small arms and 
other weapons. Rifles, submachine guns, automatic rifles combined with grenades and 
anti-tank rockets maximized lethality of the infantry squad (Hughes, 1995). Squad 
formations morphed over time from WWII through the Korean War, Vietnam, the Cold 
War, and our current Global War on Terror (GWOT). Squad size has changed from a 12-
man squad in WWII to a 9-man squad after WWII. 
“The Infantry is an all-weather, all-terrain unit. Its mission is to close with the 
enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault by 
fire, close combat, and counterattack” (DA, 2006b). Once complete, the infantry squad 
will prepare to repel an enemy counterattack or proceed with close combat attack 
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operations required for dominance throughout an Area of Operations (AO). An infantry 
squad is made up of nine Soldiers who each have responsibilities and individual jobs 
ranging from leadership to rifleman. Each position has a particular purpose with a 
collective end result being mission accomplishment. An Army infantry squad is 
controlled by the squad leader (DA, 2006b). The squad can be broken further into two 
four-man fire teams, controlled by a fire team leader (DA, 2006b). Figure 1 displays the 
distribution of weapon systems within the squad. The squad leader and fire team leaders 
are equipped with the M4A1 weapon system. The remaining members of the squad 
consist of two grenadiers carrying an M4A1 weapon system with a 40mm grenade 
launcher attachment, two riflemen equipped with a M249 squad automatic weapon 
(SAW) and two riflemen only carrying the M4A1 weapon system. There are other 
variations of a squad within a platoon, such as the Weapons Squad, however for purposes 
of this research our focus is solely on the basic infantry squad. 
 
 Breakdown of Nine-Person Infantry Squad. Source: DA (2016c). 
The diversity of a squad gives it the ability to conduct offensive, defensive, 
stability and support missions (DA, 2006b). The composition and capability of a squad 
allows it to establish its own base of fire, maneuver, ambushes, security, indirect fire and 
other battle drills to defeat the enemy.  
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In order to defeat the enemy, a squad must employ fire and maneuver as shown in 
Figure 2. Where one fire team provides suppressive fire allowing the other fire team to 
maneuver itself to a position of tactical advantage. Since the infantry squad is broken 
down into two fire teams, either one can be used as a suppressing force or assaulting 
force. “The fundamental considerations for employing infantry units result from the 
missions, types, equipment, capabilities” (DA, 2006b).  
 
 React to Contact. Source: DA (2016c). 
The infantry squad is a powerful force on the battlefield, but does not have 
overwhelming firepower compared to enemy infantry supported by an armored or 
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motorized assets (DA, 2006b). In order to achieve overmatch capability, the United 
States Army must invest in research and development to ensure overmatch.  
The readiness of an infantry squad requires qualified personnel, consistent quality 
training, and cutting-edge equipment. Equipment provides Soldiers with a technology 
advantage and acts a combat multiplier. These technologies range from clothing, 
electronic warfare hardware, as well as weaponry. During GWOT, weaponry has been 
the major concern of many Congressional leaders.  
Congressional leaders have proposed Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions 
but do not understand the United States Army’s total systems acquisition approach 
concept. This concept uses the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, 
personnel, facilities, policy (DOTmLPF-P) process to address capability gaps after 
effective analysis. A currently identified gap within the infantry squad is individual 
lethality (DA, 2006a).  
Lethality is a constant theme from our current battlefields to Army doctrine. 
Lethality applied during direct and immediate contact will be the focus of this thesis. The 
United States Army is moving forward to develop the correct combination of DOTmLPF-
P solutions. The United States Army is currently engaging the firearm/ammunition 
industries to capitalize on current firearm technology. For example, SHOT Show, 
Association of the United States Army (AUSA) and other tradeshows are prime sources 
for developmental or current products for both commercial and military applications. 
These industries have revolutionized the manufacturing processes and possess the subject 
matter expertise (SME) to provide the individual rifleman with an effective materiel fix. 
This materiel fix provides technology overmatch through the procurement and fielding of 
updated weaponry.  
Requirements assist acquisition program managers in selecting the appropriate 
acquisition strategy. The acquisition strategy ensures all user requirements are 
encapsulated within the materiel solution. This thesis examines the overall relationship 
between the costs, performance, and schedule of delivering these materiel solutions. 
Costs, performance, and schedule are the major factors which drive programmatic 
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expenses. This acquisition strategy will focus on courses and actions (COAs) ranging 
from status quo, status quo with product improvement, COTS and non-developmental 
item (NDI) materiel solutions. These COAs are compared using metrics and provide 
information to Army leadership and defense acquisition authorities. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions are addressed and analyzed in this thesis: 
1. What performance attributes contribute to operational effectiveness within 
an infantry squad? 
2. What role does small arms lethality play in the operational effectiveness of 
the infantry squad? 
3. Within the constraints of cost, schedule, and performance, what course of 
action best supports an acquisition strategy to increase operational 
effectiveness within an infantry squad? 
B. SCOPE 
This thesis utilizes unclassified documents gathered through historical references 
and literary review. The individual carbine (IC) capabilities development document (IC 
CDD) was initiated in 2008 as a requirement to improve the current M4 weapon system. 
IC CDD required the weapon system to integrate and accept the M320 40mm grenade 
launcher, mount visual aiming devices and include a system of modular accessories (i.e., 
lights optics) and a bayonet. The IC CDD also required that the weapon system be 
chambered in either 5.56mm or 7.62mm NATO standard munitions (live, training, blank, 
and dummy) (DA, 2011a). 
Advancements in polymer technology, composite durability, and a significant 
reduction in weight have placed large caliber ammunition in reach of the 5th– 95th 
percentile male and female Soldiers (Textron, 2017b). These vast improvements in 
technology have resulted in affordable, highly reliable, and effective weapon systems. 
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COAs proposed in this thesis provide information to either continue with the M4 weapon 
system or another COA.  
C. BACKGROUND 
The M4 was incorporated into the Army during the mid-1990s as a replacement 
for the aging M16 (Jenzen-Jones, 2016). Both systems utilized many of the same parts, 
maintained similar operational features, and maintenance requirements allowing for a 
seamless system transition. Figures 3 and 4 display the commonality between the 
systems. 
 
 Accessories for M16. Source: Hammack (2008). 
 7 
 
 M4 Accessory List. Source: Hammack (2008). 
M4 is suitable for the 5th - 95th percentile Soldier due to its reduced length (M16 
39 inches versus the M4 33 inches). Figure 5 demonstrates the size differences between 
the 5th – 95th percentiles. The M4 also incorporated a flat top receiver with a M1913 
Picatinny Rail to easily accept optics and other lethality devices. Despite the 
improvements of the M4 over M16 variants, there were numerous complaints about the 
operational effectiveness and reliability of the M4 (Ehrhart, 2009). For example, during 
the battle of Wanat, Afghanistan, Battle Company 173rd Airborne Brigade experienced 
multiple M4 weapon failures and malfunctions stemming from extended firefights (DA, 
2010b). Complications from environmental conditions and system reliability exacerbated 
the M4s problems and plagued operational effectiveness. This was not an isolated event 
as many Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan experienced similar problems with the M4 in 
combat (DA, 2006a).  
Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces 
to engage and destroy the enemy at ranges beyond 300 meters. These 
operations occur in rugged terrain and in situations where traditional 
supporting fires are limited due to range or risk of collateral damage. With 
these limitations, the infantry in Afghanistan require a precise, lethal fire 
capability that exists only in a properly trained and equipped infantryman. 
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While the infantryman is ideally suited for combat in Afghanistan, his 
current weapons, doctrine, and marksmanship training do not provide a 
precise, lethal fire capability to 400 meters and are therefore inappropriate. 
(Ehrhart, 2009) 
 
 5th–95th Percentile. Source: El Creative Advertising and 
Design (2007). 
Complaints from Soldiers over the lethality, effectiveness, and reliability of the 
M4 system resulted in the adoption of the IC Program in 2011 (DA, 2011a). The IC 
sought a materiel solution to gaps identified during a 2008 Capabilities Based 
Assessment (CBA) that included the M4 rifle (DA, 2011a). Gaps identified within the 
M4 system were in the areas of lethality, accuracy, and reliability. Figure 6 represents 
thresholds and objectives for the IC to provide enhancements in accuracy, lethality, 




 Key Performance Parameters (KPP). Source: DA (2011a). 
The Individual Carbine Acquisition Strategy (IC AS) was developed to acquire 
and field an individual weapon system which would deliver the following KPPs. Figure 6 
breaks down key performance parameters as follows: KPP 1 System Accuracy, KPP 2 
System Reliability, KPP 3 Compatibility, and KPP 4 Operational Availability. Our 
analysis additionally accounts for the system’s weight and range. Since the IC did not 
incorporate a new ammunition type, range and weight would remain similar to the M4 it 
was attempting to replace (DA, 2010a). To gain insight on COTS and NDI systems, the 
IC stakeholders, particularly PM Soldier Weapons, conducted market research on 
possible materiel solutions (DA, 2010a). 
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The IC AS budget and funding lines are analogous to previous programs that 
resulted in the M4 weapon system. The IC’s life cycle cost (LCC) is based on a 20-year 
sustainment plan which includes slings, magazines, cleaning kits, and manuals etc. (DA, 
2011a). The COAs rely on full and open competition, of GOTS, COTS, and NDI systems 
to leverage current technology and industry expertise (U.S. Government [USG], 2017).  
The COAs are listed as follows 
• COA1: M4A1 with M855A1 (5.56mm) 
• COA2: Modified M4A1 with New Intermediate Caliber Ammunition 
(.264 USA) 
• COA3: New Carbine with New Intermediate Caliber Ammunition (.264 
USA) 
• COA4: New Carbine with M80A1 (7.62mm) 
D. BENEFITS 
This thesis provides information to the Army and other interested parties. The 
thesis accomplishes this through analysis of criterion with measureable metrics to 
demonstrate possible COAs for future use. The objective of this thesis focuses on 
increasing the operational effectiveness of the individual rifleman, and recommends 




In the course of our research of this project, we used a series of documents, 
acquisition processes, Army field manuals (FM), and subject matter expert (SME) 
presentations to provide analysis for improving infantry squad lethality. The review and 
incorporation of material allows for a systematic approach for the necessary framework 
and discussion.  
A. INCREASING SMALL ARMS LETHALITY IN AFGHANISTAN: 
TAKING BACK THE INFANTRY HALF-KILOMETER (2009) 
Major (MAJ) Thomas P. Ehrhart (2009) researched and documented eyewitness 
accounts of M4 failures in Afghanistan. Ehrhart came to the conclusion that infantry 
squad weapons do not provide lethality at extended ranges. He also recommends changes 
to squad structure, doctrine, and improved marksmanship training. MAJ Ehrhart’s report 
is used to provide background to the current lethality problem.  
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 5000.02 
The Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02 is the instruction guide 
for all materiel acquisition development. Figure 7 outlines procedures and steps required 
for all materiel acquisition. 
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 DODI Framework. Source: Defense Acquisition University (2017). 
This thesis does not showcase a step by step process for procurement when 
providing a recommended COA. However, the COA must follow rules and policies that 
all programs must adhere too. Senior leadership must take into account the above 
framework when selecting a COA. Each COA has a different time line, but must follow 
the same DODI. The ability to tailor or streamline a COA depends on the availability, 
reliability, and manufacturability of the prescribed material solution. The COA’s 
discussed during this thesis are a mixture of COTS and NDI’s. 
C. AN ARMY OUTGUNNED: PHYSICS DEMANDS A NEW BASIC 
COMBAT WEAPON  
An article by Joseph P. Avery (2012) is used as background information for 
COA’s. Avery’s article suggest that the battlefield is a dynamic evolution of events. For 
example, during operation Gothic Serpent, Task Force Ranger experienced many 
problems with target interdiction. These problems were associated with body density 
(very thin stature of Somali combatants) and narcotic inhibitors (kaht) ingested by the 
general Somali population. This combination of body density and drug use prevented 
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instant incapacitation of Somali combatants by Task Force Ranger using 5.56mm 
munitions.  
The evolution from terrain to combatants has changed. To maintain pace with 
change, the combat basic weapon has to evolve. Incremental improvements only stymie 
the evolution of the combat basic weapon. 
As shown in GWOT, the individual rifleman is not able to effectively engage and 
kill targets beyond 400m. This unforeseen consequence is not exclusive to GWOT but 
was recorded during World War II (WWII), Korea, and Vietnam. For example, Joseph P. 
Avery Ph.D. author of “An Army Outgunned” states: 
In the World War II Pacific Theater, shooting at the enemy was a major 
problem because camouflaged Japanese forces hid in jungle growth or in 
caves and fortifications and were difficult to target/hit. The same issue 
arose in the jungles of Vietnam, where the enemy was frequently unseen. 
Today, the combat environment is very different, and the enemy is 
frequently quite visible at all ranges from close quarters to over 1,000 
yards. The M14’s maximum effective range was a respectable 400 meters 
with the sniper version having a range of 600 to 800 meters. (Avery, 2012) 
The thesis will use the article’s information to reinforce the need for change. The 
change should initially improve the lethality of the individual rifleman. This 
improvement will have a cascading effect into the lethality of the infantry squad. 
D. ARMY DOCTRINE PUBLICATION (ADP) 3-0 UNIFIED LAND 
OPERATIONS 
ADP 3-0 is the United States Army doctrine when conducting Unified Land 
Operations (ULO). ULO focuses on the Army’s ability to gain and retain area within a 
congested battlespace. Figure 8 presents the ULO concept focuses on full spectrum 
military operations comprised of offense, defense, and stability and support operations 
along with supporting tenets; depth, lethality, adaptability, flexibility, synchronization, 




 ADP 3-0 Common Operational Picture for All Organizations. 
Source: DA (2011b). 
ADP 3-0 is used in this thesis as a reference for lethality. Lethality serves as a 
tenet in offensive and defensive operations. 
E. CHAMBERING THE NEXT ROUND 
A research paper by N.R. Jenzen-Jones takes an in-depth view of factors facing 
the modern-day infantryman. Experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq have been 
complied, processed, and analyzed; this compilation of information led to the 
development of new small arms munitions (Jenzen-Jones, 2016). Examples of this new 
ammunition are displayed in Figures 9 and 10. These new munitions have become a 
priority of industry and of interest to Congress. The author of “Chambering the Next 
Round” identifies current deficiencies within U.S. and allied nation munitions. The report 
focuses on combinations of technology that will improve allied standardization, logistical 




 Comparison of Polymer versus Brass-Cased Ammunition. 
Source: Baker (2014). 
 
 From Left to Right: Traditional Brass-Cased Ammunition versus 
Case-Telescoped Ammunition. Source: Mizokami (2016). 
“Chambering the next round” is used in this thesis as a reference for munitions 
development. Munitions support the tenet of lethality in offensive and defensive 
operations. 
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F. BITING THE BULLET 
 
 Demonstration of a Yawing Round upon Target Impact. 
Source: Drummond and Williams (2009). 
A research paper written by Nicholas Drummond and Anthony Williams for the 
British Ministry of Defence on 5.56mm inadequacies. Drummond’s paper focuses on the 
NATO 5.56mm round and its lack of lethality beyond 400 meters. The yaw in particular, 
demonstrated in Figure 11, has a significant effect on target lethality. “Biting the Bullet” 
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is used in this thesis as a reference for 5.56mm ineffectiveness beyond 400 meters and its 
operational contrast against 7.62mm. The paper highlights the need for an improved 
lightweight munition of a larger caliber than 5.56mm. 
G. WHERE TO NOW? 
A presentation given by Jim Schatz to the NDIA Armaments Small Arms Forum 
in Whippany, NJ on 3 June 2015 outlined requirements for small arms overmatch. 
Capable forces such as Russia, China, and North Korea possess the ability to out range 
U.S. forces. Schatz sums up his presentation in a dynamic response to the lack 
developmental progress within U.S. small arms weaponry munitions. 
 
 Overmatch Inferiority of Current NATO Ammunition. 
Source: Schatz (2015). 
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H. DO WE NEED A NEW SERVICE RIFLE CARTRIDGE? 
The article “Do we need a new service rifle cartridge” by Jim Schatz reflects on 
5.56mm operational effectiveness. Throughout the article, Schatz demonstrates the 
ineffectiveness and lack of lethality of the 5.56mm cartridge. For example, during a 
Special Forces mission in Afghanistan, an insurgent was shot 7–8 times before falling to 
the ground. That same insurgent then somehow regained consciousness to reengage the 
Special Forces soldier. Problems with 5.56mm were accounted for during Operation 
Gothic Serpent and have not been remedied. Schatz then goes on to say that the U.S. 
should lead ammunition development, and not NATO. “Do we need a new service rifle 
cartridge” is used in this thesis as reference for growth within infantry munitions.  
I. HORNADY HANDBOOK 
The Hornady Handbook of Cartridge Reloading focuses on the development of 
munitions. The book presents calculations and measurements required for optimal 
ammunition effectiveness. It outlines the ballistic coefficient and sectional density 
required for target accuracy and defeat. Hornady defines ballistic coefficient, shown in 
Figure 13, as “the measure of a bullet’s relative ability to overcome air resistance. Each 
bullet can be assigned a numerical value expressing this efficiency. The basis of this 
value is a ratio comparing the performance characteristics of a particular bullet against 
the known trajectory characteristics of a standard projectile. The ratio compares the drag 
of a bullet (loss of velocity caused by air resistance encountered in flight) to the drag of 
the standard projectile” (Emery, 2012). 
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 Ballistic Effects on a Projectile. Source: Emery (2012). 
According to Hornady, sectional density “affects the amount of damage a bullet 
can cause” (Emery, 2012). Sectional density is defined as “a bullet’s weight in pounds 
divided by its diameter squared which describes a bullet’s length for its diameter: The 
higher the number, the longer the bullet. Generally speaking, the larger a bullet’s 
sectional density, the deeper it will penetrate” (Emery, 2012). Figure 14, demonstrates the 
penetrative capability of a projectile in 20% ballistic gelatin. Measuring the distance 
traveled provides the evaluator with better data on the potential lethality of a projectile.  
 
 Ballistic Characteristics upon Entry. Source: Emery (2012). 
J. M-16 RIFLE CASE STUDY 
The author Richard R. Hallock is a retired U.S. Army officer specializing in the 
history of the M-16 from cradle to its relevancy today. The author outlines the M16 
development and controversy stemming from reluctant commanders to politicians. The 
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establishment of NATO also played a significant role in the adoption of the 5.56mm 
round. This ensured that the caliber was consistent among all NATO forces in times of 
war. The author outlines the debate between accuracy vs. volume of fire and its presence 
on the battlefield. This debate has caused a divide in military and political arenas. The 
“M-16 Rifle Case Study” is used in this thesis as a reference for the acceptance of change 
in the military, political arenas, and NATO.  
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III. HISTORY OF THE MODERN INFANTRY SQUAD 
Modern warfare found the infantry squad as a servile unit incapable of 
independent thought or action. The stagnated eastern front of WWI led to a revolution in 
the arming of the infantry unit, and paved the way for the combined arms concept 
(Fitzsimons, 1973).  
Infantryman were often conscripts, because it was cheaper to equip and train them 
then other types of Soldiers like the cavalry or artillery (Bull, 2007). Being conscripts, 
their trust and courage under fire was questionable. Officers required the ability to issue 
voice orders to their respective formations in-masse. Noise from gun fire and artillery 
explosions would often mask these orders if the infantryman were arrayed too far apart 
from one another. Additionally, the tactics were reliant of mass fire from the unit at large, 
and not individual action or marksmanship from the individual infantryman (Cardona, 
2014).  
Repeating rifles and machine guns at the turn of the 20th century catapulted 
change within the infantry unit at a remarkable rate (Zapotoczny, 2006). European 
warfare evolved out of necessity and curiosity as military theorists experimented with the 
effectiveness of differing maneuver tactics to compensate for capability increases from 
rival nations, as well as exploit the strengths of their own materiel ingenuity (Widder, 
2002). The lethality of modern weapon systems outpaced the military tactics of the day, 
and a change was necessary if the infantryman was to have any chance of survival on the 
battlefield (Fitzsimons, 1973). 
Skirmish lines were brought to Europe by military observers studying the 
American Civil War. Jefferson Davis, then Secretary of War, commissioned a new 
infantry tactics manual be written to account for the increased capability of the “rifled 
musket.” This new Infantry manual included the concept of “comrades in battle” which 
consisted of four Soldiers who relied upon one another while performing skirmishing 
actions. These battle buddies were self-reliant, and entrusted to take appropriate action in 
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the face of the enemy, and then rejoin the larger unit once complete with skirmish line 
duties (Kerr, 1990). 
In the German Army, these forces were routinely placed under command of an 
Unteroffizer or Noncommissioned Officer. The NCO would receive orders from his 
officer, and was then left to interpret and act on them as he saw fit. Skirmish lines relied 
on strong NCO leadership to be effective. They had to fire at a much larger force who 
was continuously closing in on their position, and determine when to fallback to join their 
larger force and continue the attack (Widder, 2002). 
Linear tactics of the day did not take into account the devastating firepower of 
small arms and artillery. For example, over 6,000 German Soldiers were killed or 
wounded in just the first 30 minutes of the battle of St. Privat (Cardona, 2014). Such 
carnage could not be tolerated, and a change in tactics across Europe was necessary. To 
achieve this, skirmish lines operated as decentralized “knots” of Soldiers in depth rather 
than large bodies of infantry in depth moving in mass (Bull, 2007). This change was seen 
as a way to inflict casualties on the enemy while preserving combat power, and limiting a 
friendly forces exposure to enemy troops. 
Skirmish lines became squads, and squad leaders were expected to control the fire 
of their squad (Bull, 2007). The necessary decentralized movement from the skirmish 
lines impeded direct control from the officers, and NCOs became responsible for their 
respective formations. They were entrusted to support one another through fire and 
maneuver techniques to enable the platoon to reach its objective while supporting other 
adjacent units attempting to reach their own (Bull, 2007). 
World War I introduced new maneuver techniques to the German Army. During 
the pre-war years, an infantry unit consisted solely of riflemen, which are men carrying 
rifles. Squads were referred to as rifle squads for the same reason, and the squad 
consisted only of riflemen. The nomenclature continued upward through the rifle platoon, 
rifle company, and rifle battalion. Once at the regimental level, diversity in organization 
and equipment appeared. Each regiment contained 1 machine gun company consisting of 
3 machine gun platoons with 2 machine guns apiece (Cardona, 2014). 
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The Rifle Squad was unable to advance on the attack without suffering high 
numbers of casualties from the enemy in prepared defensive positions (Cardona, 2014). 
Before the attack, troops on either side would prepare for the assault using the same basic 
formula. Field Artillery would fire into “no man’s land” to create craters for the infantry 
to take cover, destroy or disrupt obstacles, and target enemy strongpoints or artillery 
positions (Cardona, 2014). However, the same lack of communication and coordination 
often left enemy positions undestroyed. It also failed to provide the infantry with the 
support they needed, resulting in higher casualty rates (Bull, 2007).  
Decentralized maneuver relied on trusting subordinate leaders, due to the 
difficulty commanders faced controlling them on the battlefield. The Germans referred to 
it as Auftragstaktik, the idea of individual action and initiative in the face of uncertainty 
but within the commander’s intent (Widder, 2002). Previously, the infantryman marched 
in formation, and fired volleys in mass as they closed with the enemy to deliver the final 
bayonet charge (Kerr, 1990). Skirmish lines had the liberty and flexibility to utilize 
terrain to their advantage. Rifle squads were trusted to take advantage of their modern 
firearms and engage the enemy from more advantageous positions to inflict casualties on 
the enemy and remain protected (Bull, 2007). 
Auftragstaktik, was born from German experiences in battle with Napoleon, and 
carried through the 19th and into the 20th century (Widder, 2002). Skirmishers, lines of 
troops forward of the main body, were a standard affair in European warfare, and were 
tasked with making precision shots at approaching enemy forces to exact casualties 
before the main body of the enemy could effectively range the German Army’s main 
body (Cardona, 2014).  
The German High Command realized this problem, and experimented with 
different techniques of equipping their Soldiers with multiple weapons like rifles and 
hand grenades (Cardona, 2014). The German Army sought a method to break through the 
stalemate on the Western front. Experimentation led to the development of the 
Sturmbattalion (Storm Battalion) and Stroβtruppen (Storm Troopers) which relied on 
competent small unit leaders, capable of conducting independent maneuver in support of 
an overall objective (Cardona, 2014). 
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Stroβtruppen were specially trained Soldiers optimized in siege warfare and the 
attack (Bull, 2007). Integration of multiple skillsets increased the versatility of the squad. 
No longer was the squad comprised of riflemen carrying rifles, and grenadiers carrying 
grenades. Stroβtruppen were cross-trained to employ multiple weapon systems to 
magnify their effectiveness and reduce their reliance on other units for support (Cardona, 
2014). The Stroβtruppen concept was initially a goal for all German Soldiers, but 
continuous combat operations prevented it from becoming a reality (Cardona, 2014). It 
did, however, became the model for future infantry units to emulate. 
The U.S. Army witnessed the effectiveness of the Stroβtruppen first hand during 
WWI. In turn, they used those experiences to design infantry squads for WWII (Hughes, 
1995). Normally, infantry squads were equipped solely with rifles. However, the modern 
squads were equipped with a mixture of rifles, submachine guns, and automatic rifles 
combined with grenades and anti-tank rockets which maximized the lethality of the 
infantry squad (Hughes, 1995). 
Cross training within the squad became the norm; all Soldiers are expected to be 
familiar with all of the weapons in the squad. As they become available, new 
technologies and capabilities are integrated into the squad, in an effort to continually 
maximize the squad’s effectiveness. Not only did weapon systems change, but squad 
formations morphed over time from WWII to our current war on terror. Squad size was 
based on a dual function of personnel availability and a desired effectiveness level 
(Karcher, 2002). Squad size changed over time from its peak at 12-men during WWII 
down to a low of an 8-man after the introduction of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle to our 
current 9-man squad across all infantry organizations (Hughes, 1995).  
What did not change however, was the role of the squad leader within the squad 
and platoon. Squad leaders are expected to execute their mission in support of the 
overarching Commander’s Intent for the operation through mission command (DA, 
2007). Infantry squads are expected to utilize “mission oriented command and control to 
lead the squad, and complete their mission (DA, 2007). Mission command teaches the 
empowerment of subordinate leaders at each level (Deparment of the Army [DA], 
2012a). A leader is empowered to accomplish his mission based on his understanding of 
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his mission’s task and purpose and the mission(s) of other adjacent units. Leaders are 
expected to seize the initiative and exploit gains won from the enemy. The infantry squad 
leader is a trusted NCO who is expected to use his experience and tactical knowledge to 
lead his squad and close with and destroy the enemy (DA, 2012a). 
Integration of new technologies continue to increase the effectiveness of the 
infantry squad. More powerful small arms and other weapon systems coupled with day 
and night optics provide the infantryman with unparalleled effectiveness on the 
battlefield. Infantry squads continue to increase their autonomy in current Counter 
Insurgency (COIN) operations. Often squads conduct independent patrols from fire bases 
in the mountains of Afghanistan. Squad leaders are expected to maintain communications 
with their higher headquarters while coordinating with air and other combat multipliers to 
defeat the enemy and accomplish their mission.  
Infantryman will always be relevant on the battlefield. The U.S. Army Operating 
Concept: Win in a Complex World characterizes that “future armed conflict will be 
complex…because threats, enemies, and adversaries are becoming increasingly capable and 
elusive.” (DA, 2014b). The Air Force may be able to bomb an objective, and the Navy 
may be able to launch cruise missiles from hundreds of miles away. But it is the 
infantryman who is required to hold the ground, and his success rests in part on the 
effectiveness of his rifle.   
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IV. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 
INFANTRY SQUAD 
The mission of an infantry squad must be considered early in the acquisition 
process. Greater comprehension of the elements for operational effectiveness will lead to 
the procurement of more suitable systems. There are different explanations used for 
describing operational effectiveness. Defense Acquisition University explains operational 
effectiveness as the ability to accomplish a mission with a specific system and 
representative personnel (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2017). An effective 
infantry squad is capable of projecting its military capability among adversaries.  
There are a diverse number of variables, both qualitative and quantitative needed 
to create a potent combat-ready force. The qualitative variables, such as training, 
leadership, demographics, and comradery are extremely important with any unit. 
However, these variables are influenced by the unit, and are dependent on different 
personalities, culture, which contribute to the organizational climate. Tactical and 
technical proficiency, on the other hand, are quantitative variables which can be shaped 
through the acquisition process. Understanding the squad and correctly distinguishing 
these factors are fundamental during the design and development of systems, which 
support the rifleman.  
The ability to conduct fire and maneuver is dependent on the quality of equipment 
developed for the infantry squad. Organic systems like the rifle and machine gun as well 
as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and Stryker Combat Vehicle were developed based on 
how the Army defined operational effectiveness early in the acquisition process. 
Therefore, equipment designed to produce greater effective fires to support 
maneuverability will produce overmatch capability in comparison to our adversaries.  
Decomposition of an infantry squad allows us to break it into two distinct 
components, personnel and equipment (DA, 1946). Increasing the potential of personnel 
is essential in the maximizing squad effectiveness. However, as mentioned above, this 
can only be achievable at each individual organization. These unmeasurable elements 
consume characteristics which cannot be evaluated during the early design phase of a 
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system. Consequently, our focus on achieving maximum effectiveness is based on 
measureable elements—equipment, specifically the rifle and ammunition.  
A powerful force on the battlefield, the infantry squad alone does not have 
overwhelming firepower compared to peer and near-peer adversaries. In order to achieve 
overmatch against the enemy we must invest in research and development to ensure the 
best systems are in our soldiers’ hands. The rifle is the most important system an 
infantryman has at his disposal.  
Analysis of alternatives are conducted on different avenues, research into 
amplifying the fundamental qualities must be explored. Small arms fire superiority is 
achieved through a rifle that can deliver high volumes of accurate fire at the enemy. 
Comparatively, the rifle should not reduce the mobility of the rifleman or hamper the 
functionality of the entire squad.  
Using a holistic approach to view operational effectiveness drives the dynamics of 
the study to a different spectrum. Hence, the application of the following evaluative 
criteria during the acquisition process is a measurement for operational effectiveness: 




This chapter discusses the procedures used in our decision-making process. An 
upfront explanation of the courses of action, criteria, and risks provides a familiarization 
prior to comparison. Our explanation is followed by an analysis of the raw, normalized, 
and weighted data. Evaluating each factor systematically provides a thorough comparison 
for a potential solution. We conclude the chapter by completing a sensitivity analysis to 
reveal possible trends in the data or factors which could arbitrarily skew the results.  
A. COURSES OF ACTION 
Our research will focus on four distinct courses of action (COAs). These COAs 
are not intended to lead directly to a specific materiel solution. Instead, they will lead to 
an acquisition strategy to determine the optimal COA to follow. Our recommended 
acquisition strategy accounts for lessons learned from both the Individual Carbine (IC) 
and Modular Handgun System (MHS) Acquisition Strategies.  
The considered COAs leverage COTS/NDI systems which will include the 
weapon and ammunition optimized to meet the user’s requirements. Evaluation of the 
COAs ensures their ability to meet the user’s requirements in an operational environment 
while providing a best value to the government. Our intent is not developing a system, 
but evaluating the systems based on performance specifications. This methodology 
reduces the risk to the government, and encourages innovation within the small arms 
industry to meet the Army’s requirement (DA, 2014a).  
Courses of Action: 
• COA1: M4A1 with M855A1 (5.56mm) 
• COA2: Modified M4A1 with New Intermediate Caliber Ammunition 
(.264 USA) 
• COA3: New Carbine with New Intermediate Caliber Ammunition (.264 
USA) 
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• COA4: New Carbine with M80A1 (7.62mm)  
COA1: Course of Action 1 is basically the status quo and is a baseline for the 
purposes of this study. COA1 does not provide any enhancements or increase to the 
lethality of the system. Instead COA1 anchors the remaining COAs against an objective 
to attain. If the M4A1 with M855A1 ammunition meets the user’s current requirement, 
then the other COAs must outperform COA1 in order to represent a better value to the 
government. 
The M4A1 is a current system, and has minimal planned additional research and 
development funds to maintain currency. We assumed that additional functionality could 
be added to rifle at a cost of $2million in overall R&D funds.  
COA2: Course of Action 2 represents an increase in capability through the 
adoption of an intermediate caliber ammunition type (Jenzen-Jones, 2016). This COA 
balances the cost associated with the type classification of a new ammunition type. The 
M4A1 is a trusted, versatile, and battle proven platform and has served the U.S. military 
in various forms since the Vietnam War. The M4’s versatility comes from its ability to be 
easily reconfigured to meet different mission requirements. M4A1’s utilizes an upper and 
lower receiver group which are easily separated and interchangeable between weapons. 
Weapons can be easily modified with accessories or other parts to meet different mission 
requirements.  
Course of Action 2 would involve modifying the M4A1 to fire a new ammunition 
type. The modification would come from changing the necessary parts in the upper 
receiver group to accept a new ammunition type that would be compatible with the 
M4A1 upper (Griffin, 2015). Preferably, the conversion would require changing the 
barrel, bolt, and maybe a few other small items but would not require a change to upper 
receiver housing. The program may not see a significant reduction in test and evaluation 
cost, but the relatively low prices of these parts could significantly reduce the 
procurement costs.  
COA3: Course of Action 3 would include both a totally new weapon system and 
a new ammunition type. Similar to COA2; COA3 would utilize an intermediate round to 
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bridge the gap between the M855A1-5.56mm and M80A1- 7.62mm rounds. However, 
unlike COA2; COA3 would invest in an entirely new small arms weapon (different than 
the M4A1) (Skovand, 2017). Input from the Army’s Small Arms Ammunition 
Configuration Study (SAAC) will undoubtedly inform the requirements for the next 
weapon system (Dawson, 2014). This COA represents a full-up test and evaluation plan 
for both a weapon and ammunition to achieve an increased capability. COA3 will seek a 
COTS/NDI system solution to meet the requirement, and reduce risk to the program.  
COA4: Course of Action 4 is a new weapon system with a currently type 
classified ammunition type, M80A1-7.62mm. This COA represents a balance between 
COA1 and COA3 by mating a new weapon system with a current type classified 
ammunition type. COA4 mitigates risk to the program by reducing cost below COA3 
through the use of a current ammunition type, and increasing the capability to the 
warfighter as in COAs 2 and 3.  
Similar to COA3, the SAAC Study will inform the requirements for a new 
weapon system. M80A1 will increase the lethality, but a new weapon will seek to 
increase functionality. 7.62mm ammunition can be utilized in a number of different 
firearm platforms, and may represent a viable alternative to intermediate caliber options. 
B. PROCESS 
Our methodology is based on four performance factors to maximize the 
operational effectiveness of the infantryman. Each criterion must assess the critical 
component’s intended use. These components consist of both performance and risk 
factors. Performance factors are important since they become part of the infantry squad 
capabilities following the successful selection and procurement of the system. 
Performance factors are, in order of importance: lethality, accuracy, mobility, and 
interoperability. Risks are both internal to the project and external. Internal risks are cost 
and schedule as both are drivers to a course of action and an acquisition strategy to 
deliver a capability for the warfighter. Other risks factors such as political and 
international, where Congress and NATO may play into the adaptation of a new small 
arms capability for the infantryman. 
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1. Performance Criteria 
a. Factor 1: Lethality 
Increasing Soldier lethality is a high priority for the Army. The first objective in 
the 2015 modernization strategy is the investment in systems (weapons, optics, and etc.) 
which provide Soldier and Squad with improved lethality (U.S. Army, 2015). Presently, 
the new Army Modernization Priorities signed in 2017 has Soldier lethality as one of its 
six priorities (Judson, 2017). 
Lethality is the ability of the weapon system, rifle and ammunition, to inflict 
wounds on the enemy and incapacitate him. Incapacitation is defined as the inability of 
the enemy combatant to conduct military tasks. Lethality is comprised of multiple facets 
that each affect the ability of the weapon system to achieve its goal of incapacitating the 
enemy. The military defines lethality as the Probability of Incapacitation Given a Hit (PI/
H) (Minisi, 2016). Our thesis will focus on the Sectional Density (SD) of the projectile to 
determine lethality.  
Sectional Density: Sectional Density is an attribute of a projectile which 
determines the efficiency of the projectile. The Hornady Handbook of Cartridge 
Reloading defines it as “the ratio of a bullet’s weight in pounds to the square of its 
diameter in inches.” In other words, “bullets of the same shape, but with more weight in 
relation to their diameter will retain their velocity and energy better” (Emery, 2012). For 
example, a 7.62x51mm caliber rifle is capable of firing cartridges loaded with different 
bullets of varying weights and lengths intended for that caliber. As the weight of the 
bullet increases, so does the sectional density (Emery, 2012). 
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 Penetration of a 7.62 Round in a Gelatin Substance. 
Source: Minisi (2016). 
b. Factor 2: Accuracy 
The IC AS states the next generation rifle must provide accurate engagements 
from 0 to 600 meters throughout the range of military operations and environments (DA, 
2011a). System Accuracy is listed as KPP 1 in the IC CDD, and the MHS CPD (DA, 
2008, 2011a).  
Weapon accuracy encompasses several factors that will affect the weapons at 
greater ranges. Our study focuses on Ballistic Coefficient (BC), which is a measure of the 
aerodynamic drag on a bullet. A higher BC retains its velocity greater during flight 
(Griffin, 2015). Generally, longer, tapered rounds are more aerodynamic, resulting in a 
higher BC (Emery, 2012). Exploiting the combination of these elements help maximize 
target effectiveness at ranges beyond 300 meters. 
c. Factor 3: Mobility 
A Key System Attribute (KSA) of the Squad Designated Rifle CPD is system 
weight (DA, 2016b). System weight adversely affects an infantryman’s ability to 
maneuver on the battlefield and pursue the enemy (Bernton & Nowlin, 2003). Mobility 
for our study is the combination of weapon and 210 rounds of ammunition as carried by 
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the rifleman. Figure 16 depicts the individual and cumulative weight an infantryman can 
expect to carry during an approach march as well as actions on the objective.  
 
 
 Equipment Weight Carried by the Average Infantryman. 
Source: Bernton and Nowlin (2003). 
Infantryman throughout history have carried between 50 and 60lbs on their backs 
while marching to battle (DA, 2009). Tests conducted by the Army found that as carried 
weight decreased, small arms accuracy increased (DA, 2009). A larger round will 
increase the weight per round and decrease a rifleman’s mobility and effectiveness.  
d. Factor 4: Interoperability 
Interoperability within an infantry squad refers to the ability of squad members to 
exchange magazines and ammunition between one another. For our assessment we 
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measure interoperability as the percentage of infantryman in a 9-man squad utilizing the 
same ammunition type, and can then cross load as needed.  
The necessity for members to operate as a cohesive unit with common equipment 
is indispensable. A small arms survey conducted in 2016 stated a standardization of 
calibers within an infantry squad provides a tactical advantage via the interoperability of 
ammunition (Jenzen-Jones, 2016). 
2. Program Risks 
a. Risk 1: Cost 
Cost risk associated with a program can result in program cancellation if costs rise 
beyond projections or if the capability seems unaffordable. It can be argued that costs 
should not be evaluated as part of COA analysis. However, all acquisition programs must 
compete for the same resources. Showing cost savings while providing for an increased 
capability to the Service will help achieve program success.  
b. Risk 2: Schedule 
Similar to cost, schedule can be an important element to a program’s success. 
Some acquisition programs require extended schedules due to intense development 
required to fully deliver the capability. In this case, a rifle is a very mature technology, 
and would not require an extended Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase 
to validate whether the requirements are attainable. To reduce schedule risk, we 
anticipate the COTS/NDI nature of our program to enter acquisition process at pre-
milestone C like MHS program and reduce the overall schedule (DA, 2014a). For our 
assessment, an extended schedule is disadvantageous to the program’s success.  
3. Other Risk Factors 
a. Political Risk 
Political risk is an important factor, but does not weigh as heavily as cost, 
schedule, or performance. Politicians wield power within the acquisition domain, and can 
affect the decision makers within the Services. Requirements must have traceability to 
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higher level documents such as the National Security Strategy or the National Defense 
Strategy as well as map to the priorities of the respective Service Chief. Inability to do 
this places increased risk on the program by Congress and other elected officials.  
Congress has the ability to defund programs that it feels are unnecessary or are 
not being managed to produce the capability required of the military. Political risk cannot 
be quantified numerically in the same manner as other types of risk. However, it is 
important and must be discussed with respect to any course of action. 
b. NATO Risk 
NATO risk, much like political risk, cannot be quantified because neither 
concurrence nor support are sought from NATO before determining a small arms path. 
NATO played a critical factor in deterring Soviet aggression during the cold war (B. 
Halpern, interview with authors, August 2017). However, since the fall of the USSR, 
NATO small arms interoperability has assumed a less prominent role.  
The U.S. military has effectively established NATO small arms standards since 
the late 1940s (Hallock, 1970). NATO and other partner nations will accept U.S. small 
arms standards based on the R&D and testing conducted by the U.S. military. Therefore, 
there is minimal risk to NATO nonoccurrence affecting the outcome of the U.S. Army’s 
small arms program (Halpern, 2017).  
To ensure NATO interoperability, European NATO partners provide a 
predetermined amount of ammunition to a NATO small arms test center on an annual 
basis for testing with other nation’s weapons. All of the NATO partners participate in this 
testing process except for the U.S. Although we utilize ammunition in a similar caliber 
we do not provide ammunition to NATO to ensure NATO partner interoperability. 
Therefore, just because the ammunition is the same caliber, it does not represent the same 
capability and is not guaranteed to be interoperable.  
NATO small arms capabilities are influenced by U.S. research and development 
(Halpern, 2017). A meeting with the Chair of the NATO Weapons & Sensors Sub Group 
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at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ revealed that several non-NATO partner nations are adapting 
their small arms fleet to fire NATO Standard ammunition (Halpern, 2017).  
These nations are modernizing their Soviet Bloc weapons to show solidarity with 
the West (Halpern, 2017). Although based on speculation, it can be anticipated that these 
nations would be interested in purchasing our stock of 5.56mm ammunition and rifles. 
Purchasing our weapons and ammunition would provide them with a jump start to NATO 
standardization. Figure 17, depicts the future small arms plans for multiple NATO and 
non-NATO partner nations.  
 
 NATO Future Small Arms Development and Integration Plans. 
Source: Halpern (2017). 
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4. Raw Data Analysis 
Analyzing the raw data does not provide a clear view of which COA is superior 
across the board. Each COA presents merits within the different evaluation metrics. Table 
1 provides the raw data for each factor.  
Table 1.  Raw Data Associated with Performance Factors, 
Program, and International Risks.  
 
a DA (2011a). 
a. Performance Criteria 
Lethality: Using SD as the evaluation factor, COAs 2 and 3 are superior to COAs 
1 and 4. Surprisingly, COA4 with its larger ammunition type did not present a higher 
lethality rating. COAs 2 and 3 both utilize an undetermined intermediate caliber cartridge 
which is understood to have a higher SD than COA1 (Emery, 2012). The 7.62x51mm 
ammunition normally exhibits a higher SD, however the use of the M80A1 cartridge 
reduces SD in an effort to prioritize other ammunition characteristics (DA, 2012b). 
Accuracy: Once again, COAs 2, 3, and 4 outperform COA1 on accuracy. This is 
not surprising since COA1 utilizes the smallest and lightest projectile of the four COAs. 
COA4 utilizes the Army’s new 7.62x51mm round, the M80A1 which is a lighter 
projectile than the previous generation M80. The two rounds are 131, and 147 grains 
respectively. Reducing the weight of the cartridge reduces the amount of propellant 
required to achieve a desired muzzle velocity (Nathaniel F., 2016). 
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Intermediate caliber cartridges normally bridge the gap between 5.56mm and 
7.62mm. They offer a longer projectile with a smaller diameter to perform efficiently at 
longer ranges (Jenzen-Jones, 2016). We selected the .264USA as our intermediate caliber 
of choice for this analysis, however, other intermediate caliber cartridges can be expected 
to perform similarly (Griffin, 2015). 
Mobility: COA1 is clearly superior in this category. COAs 2, 3, and 4 all 
represent a heavier weapon and ammunition combination than the M4A1 with 210 rounds 
of M855A1 ammunition. COA4 is the least desirable at almost 25 pounds. 7.62mm rifles 
are normally heavier than their small caliber counterparts due to the increased velocity 
and chamber pressure exhibited on the firearm (Emery, 2012).  
COAs 2 and 3 tie for 2nd place behind COA1. These two COAs represent only a 
slight increase in weight over the status quo. This weight increase is less than 3.5lbs, and 
could be considered negligible over COA1. However, any increase in weight decreases 
mobility, and this must be taken into consideration when selecting a COA (DA, 2009). 
Interoperability: COA1 is superior when evaluated against interoperability. The 
M249SAW fires the same ammunition type as the M4A1; allowing for riflemen to cross 
load ammunition as needed during combat. COAs 2, 3, and 4 utilize a separate 
ammunition type than the M249. In these COAs, only the 7 riflemen are interoperable 
with each other; leaving the 2 SAW gunners interoperable.  
However, the marginal benefit of 9 rifleman versus 7 riflemen and the 2 SAW 
gunners is low. All squad members are interoperable with another squad member who 
utilizes the same ammunition type. Also, even though the M4A1 and M249 utilize the 
same ammunition type, they are not perfectly interoperable. The M4A1 fires from a 
magazine, and the M249 is primarily a belt fed weapon. The M249 can accept a 30 round 
M4A1 magazine, however, the weapon is much more prone to malfunction and would 
only fire from a magazine in emergency situations.  
Risk can be mitigated with these performance factors through adoption of a new 
Squad Automatic Weapon chambered in a similar round. The Army’s Next Generation 
Squad Automatic Rifle and Ammunition Capability Decision Document will seek 
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ammunition compatibility within the family of weapons (carbine, squad designated 
marksman rifle) (DA, 2016a). 
Similarly, adoption of the Mk48 lightweight machine gun chambered in 
7.62x51mm from USSOCOM would mitigate interoperability between weapon systems. 
This would, however, required increased time and funding to ensure interoperability 
exists and to type classify the weapon system for the Army (Johnson, 2011). 
b. Program Risks 
Cost: Cost is an inevitable factor associated with any acquisition program. COA1, 
is clearly the favorite in this category. However, it is only the favorite because of the sunk 
costs and timeline of previously developing the system to meet the needs of the Vietnam 
War and continuously modifying it since its adoption. The Army’s Individual Carbine 
(IC) program sought to increase the effectiveness of the individual rifleman’s rifle with a 
new system. The failure of this program led to the adoption of the M4A1 (Shinkman, 
2013). Failure to account for this would increase risk of making the same mistakes as the 
IC.  
COA2 is promising when comparing the raw data. These costs depict an 
estimation of funds needed to test the M4A1 modifications to meet the user’s 
requirements. Both this COA and COA3 require a new ammunition type, and the critical 
path of these schedule would follow the time necessary to qualify and type classify a new 
ammunition type.  
COA4 splits the difference between COAs 2 and 3. Cost risks associated with 
COA4 stem from testing and validation of a new rifle. The new weapon system will 
constitute a one for one swap within the infantry squad. Thereby, increasing squad 
lethality through the individual rifleman. COA4 is more expensive than COA1, however 
COA4 has the ability for future upgrades while COAs 1 and 2 do not. 
Schedule: COA1 is preferred in this category, but only because it is a legacy 
system that is currently fielded across the entire DOD. COA4 is second with an estimated 
18 months to validate the system’s performance with M80A1 ammunition. 
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COA2 and COA3 are substantially longer because they both require a new 
ammunition type. Type classifying ammunition requires roughly 1 year to complete all 
the tasks. Propellants and primers are tested to ensure the safety and stability of the 
materials. Propellants are also artificially aged to 20 years to ensure the propellant will 
retain the required energetics and perform properly through proper storage of the war 
stock.  
c. Other Risks 
Political: COAs 2, 3, and 4 achieve the political desires of the Army and 
Congress. They each increase the lethality of the rifleman. Lethality is a key driver in the 
Chief of Staff of the Army’s modernization plan (Tucker, 2017). Congress is showing 
reluctance to fund major Army programs which show little promise in successfully 
placing capabilities in Soldier’s hands (Myers, 2017). A low risk program such as this 
would encourage the Army to tackle other modernization programs. 
COA1 does not increase the capability of the rifleman on the battlefield. COA4 
provides an increase at an acceptable cost and schedule. COAs 2 and 3 provide an 
opportunity for a bridging strategy to deliver an increased capability to the rifleman 
rapidly through COA2, and then following up with a completely new platform for the 
rifleman under COA3.  
NATO: COAs 1 and 4 are acceptable to NATO since they both utilize a NATO 
standard caliber. As discussed earlier however, the U.S. military does not provide 
ammunition to NATO for interoperability testing with NATO small arms. Although, they 
are the same caliber, they are not the same ammunition. COAs 2 and 3 are unfavorable, 
because they represent an entirely new ammunition caliber. In a Cold War-esque battle, 
NATO forces could not resupply ammunition to U.S. forces as they would be completely 
inoperable. However, the British Army has a similar desire to upgrade its small arms 
weapon system to a larger and more effective caliber (Drummond & Williams, 2009). 
The British Army has similar lessons learned from battles over the years. Developing a 
common ammunition type along with the Brits may be a viable solution which could 
encourage NATO to follow suit (Halpern, 2017). 
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d. Summary 
At a cursory look the raw data initially points toward COA1 with superior raw 
data ratings across four of the criteria. Figure 18, depicts the system level improvements 
of the M4A1 from 1991 to the present. However, COA1 is inferior to the other three 
COAs in the two most important criteria; lethality and accuracy. These criteria rate higher 
than the others because they represent the increased capability to the rifleman. Any COA 
that does not improve lethality or accuracy cannot be considered as a viable COA. 
Depending on the factor or risk category, any of the other COAs or combination of COAs 
can present a viable option to the warfighter. Normalization of the data may provide more 
insight into the data, and provide a clear trend to a particular COA.  
 
 Linear Timeline of Small Arm Improvements. 
Source: Dawson (2012).
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5. Normalized Data Comparison 
Analyzing the raw data did not present a clear winner amongst the COAs. In an 
effort to further distinguish them from one another, we normalized the data within the 
value models on the previous page. The performance factors are given a value score 
based the value of the raw data for each respective value model. Raw data is valued from 
0 – 1, with 1 being the best. These scores are summarized in Table 2 and the 
corresponding value curves shown in Table 3.  









Lethality: After normalization the data, COAs 2 and 3 are superior to COAs 1 
and 4. COA1 and COA4 employ a projectile with a lower SD than COAs 2 and 3. The 
intermediate caliber cartridge is still superior after normalizing the data (Jenzen-Jones, 
2016). 
Accuracy: COAs 2, 3, and 4 depict superior normalized data than COA1. COA 2 
and 3 represent a projectile with a higher BC than COAs 1 and 4, which lends to their 
superior normalized rating. Normalized accuracy ratings trend similarly to the raw data 
ratings of the COAs.  
Mobility: COA1 follows the trend set in the raw data assessment with COAs 2 
and 3 trailing close behind. After normalization, COA4’s additional weight greatly 
reduces its attractiveness as a viable solution and barely scores above a 0 rating.  
Interoperability: There is no change to COA rankings after normalizing the 
interoperability ratings. Only COA1 offers 100% interoperability. Risk mitigation 
techniques must be employed to ensure that all ammunition in the squad are interoperable 
with one another. As with the raw data, the marginal benefit of increased interoperability 
does not increase the viability of COA1. 
PROGRAM RISKS: N/A 
OTHER RISKS: N/A 
SUMMARY: 
Program risks and other risks are not normalized in order to prevent skewing of 
the data. These factors are unable to be quantified in a similar manner as with the raw 
data. Additionally, these risk factors should not be normalized against the performance 
factors since they do not present factors that affect the lethality of the rifleman in the 
infantry squad.  
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6. Weighted Analysis Comparison 
Normalization is the first step into understanding the data and eventually 
assessing results. The next phase of COA evaluation is dependent on the four weighted 
criterions and the selected weights. Table 4 depicts the weighted performance criteria.  
Table 4.  Weighted Quantity COA Totals 
 
a DA (2011a). 
 
Determination of proper weights are based on a swing weight breakdown. The use 
of swing weights vice preference weights are reflective of valid decision making. Swing 
weights were based on the variation and importance of each attribute. We concluded the 
following classification: 50% or below was low variation, 51%-75% medium variation, 
and 76% and above was high variation. User prioritization served as the determinant for 
the level of importance for each attribute.  
Next, we placed each corresponding weight to a factor. Table 5, displays the location of 
each criterion on the swing weight table. Starting from the top-left (considered most 
important) to bottom-right (considered least important), each criteria receives a 
subsequent number and resultant location in our matrix. The most important value was 
given a numerical value of 100 and placed at the very top-left. Each additional attribute, 
as shown in Table 5, shall have a lesser value and location on the matrix. The swing 
weight values are computed together to obtain Total Swing Weight Value of 265. 
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Table 5.  Swing Weight Table 
 
 
Next, we divided each individual factor swing weight by the total swing weight to 
determine the measured weight. The Table 6 details the remaining values. 
Table 6.  Measured Weights Following Application of Swing Weights 
 
Total criterion values are found by multiplying the measured weights by the value 
scores. If measuring lethality, for instance, we take 0.38 (measured weight) multiplied by 
the normalized data of one of the COA (COA1 = .180). Ensuring an accurate metric is 
crucial for comparison analysis.  
 
PERFORMANCE CRITERIA: 
Lethality: The weighted data revealed COA2 and 3 are still drastically superior to 
COAs 1 and 4. Lethality is the highest rated criterion compared to the other factors, and 
amplifies COAs with a higher sectional density.  
importance of value measure











Evaluation Measure swing weight Measure Weight
Lethality (Sectional Density) 100 0.38
Accuracy (Ballistic Coefficient) 90 0.34
Mobility [(wgt*210)+wgt of system] 55 0.21
Interoperability (% of similar ammo w/in sqd) 20 0.08
1.00
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Accuracy: Measured weight for accuracy equals 0.34. COA2 and 3 were best 
qualified in this area with a total of 0.088. COA4 is at .064, followed by COA1 with a 
weight of 0.051.  
Mobility: Comparing mobility across each course of action was relatively closer. 
COA1 was the highest ranking with 0.21. COAs 2 and 3 are at 0.173. The marginal 
difference between COA1 and COAs 2 and 3 may be worth the investment in greater 
killing potential (lethality and accuracy).  
Interoperability: The current program is the only system that reflects an 
optimum interoperability solution. Since all nine members of a squad are able to carry the 
same ammunition, results in COA1 ranked highest at 0.075. COAs 2, 3, and 4 all rate at 
0.057. As with the raw data and normalized data analysis the marginal benefit of 7 and 2 
versus 9 is negligible. However, changes in tactics and employment techniques of new 
weapon system would mitigate potential vulnerabilities with the squad.  
PROGRAM RISKS: N/A 
OTHER RISKS: N/A 
SUMMARY: 
In summary, the selection of a specific course of action can be skewed based on 
the individual weightings of the performance factors. Therefore, it is essential to 
understand the concept of operations and higher strategy. Additionally, the program 
manager must account for the underlying risks associated with each course of action. 
Accomplishing a qualitative analysis of the program risks (cost and schedule) gives a 
more well-rounded evaluation. Based on the resulting combination of both performance 
factors and program elements gives a balanced assessment for decision-makers.  
7. Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis allows us to test the feasibility of data. Selecting the right 
data is paramount for making informed decisions. Comparing multiple ranges develops a 
useful gauge to assess the corresponding outputs. Upfront identification of poor 
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assumptions or insufficient inputs limit corrupted outputs and gives credibility to our 
selected methodology.  
Our sensitivity analysis serves two purposes. First to provide the reader a 
realization that superficial weights are used to generate total scores. Second to verify that 
our weight selections are congruent with the current environment and leadership. 
To provide realism in our study we conducted fifty valuations using different 
weighted trials. The corroboration of these different variations explains the diversity of 
our model, and observes the data behavior as the model changes. Table 7 shows a portion 
of these trial variations. The weights provided are the most prevalent for rationalizing our 
selected model weights. Initially, the attributes were tested with an equal weighting of .25 
(highlighted in yellow). The total COA score resulted in the following: COA1 = 0.582, 
COA2 = 0.587, COA3 = 0.587, COA4 = 0.409. After further analysis of the volatility 
between each attribute, we weighted lethality extremely higher versus the other attributes. 
Weight 2 trial displays COA2 and 3 as glaring victors, defeating COA1 and 4. 
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Table 7.  Sensitivity Analysis Trials 
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We composed another test with lethality and accuracy ranked higher at 0.500 and 
0.400 compared to 0.050 for both mobility and interoperability. Again, COA2 and COA3 
prevailed. 
Further insight into the behavioral patterns of the attributes were needed to 
determine if there were any scenarios where one attribute would make COA1 or 4 
superior. We preceded by ranking each attribute equal 1.0 while zeroing out the other 
three. Lethality and accuracy did not result in any new changes (weights 4 & 5 records); 
both attributes clearly favored COA2 and 3 when ranked high. On the other hand, both 
mobility and interoperability logically favored COA1 (weights 6 & 7 records), since both 
these attributes are key advantages of the current weapon system.  
Further sampling was performed to verify precision of our selected weights. We 
incrementally lowered the weights making sure mobility and interoperability were 
weighted heavier than lethality and accuracy. Then, we decided to switch and keep 
lethality and accuracy higher than the other two criterions which allowed us to identify 
any trends in our analysis. First, interoperability, is more sensitive to external 
adjustments. Therefore, weighting too high may skew the veracity of our model. This 
tendency is seen in weights 16 and 17 where interoperability is the highest. Second, 
mobility should not be greater than 25% of the overall measurements. This helps 
maintain a consistent relationship among the other variables. Thirdly, lethality and 
accuracy were major contributors when the results favored COA2 and COA3; whereas if 
mobility and interoperability are rated higher the results favored COA1. In the end, none 







Table 8.  Sensitivity Overview 
 
Table 8 is an overview table to give the reader a better idea of how sensitive the 
attributes are to random applications. Posted on the table are twenty-four of the weighted 
records used to conduct our analysis. COAs 2 and 3 are rated together since they are 
using the same caliber for this notional model. The items highlighted in green are the 
highest for a particular trial. Fifty percent of the time COA1 was considered a better fit 
for the performance factors. The other 50 percent of the time COA2 and 3 prevailed. This 
demonstrates the instability of weights if randomly selected. Furthermore, it reaffirms the 
prerequisite for properly decomposing the functional requirements to validate the needs 
of the infantryman. As mentioned previously, COA4 was not favored in any scenario. 
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This may be indicative of a potential caliber ceiling, which can be a major benefit when 
settling on capabilities and establishing acquisition strategies.  
Our investigation allowed us to gauge the data points and create benchmarks. 
Conducting a sensitivity analysis exposed the accuracy of our outputs by displaying any 
vulnerabilities to our inputs. These vulnerabilities are knowledge points or critical 
junctures, which must be considered in the application of our model. Cognizance of the 
strategic guidance and requirements composition will help further define the correct 
weights for the value model. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS/AREAS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Each COA explored in this thesis represents a viable option to the procurement of 
a new or updated combat rifle for the infantryman. GEN Miley, Chief of Staff of the 
Army, rated Soldier Lethality as one of his top priorities for Army modernization during 
a recent Association of the United States Army (AUSA) speech (Lopez, 2017). 
COA1 does not provide any increase in lethality. It may provide an increase in 
functionality with overall performance related improvements similar to the M4A1 and 
M4 Product Improvement Program (PIP) (Dawson, 2012). The M4/M16 family of 
weapons has been in the DOD’s inventory since its debut in the Vietnam War (Scales, 
2016 ). The Army has made over 100 improvements in the system since its adoption; 
with over 90 conducted since Operation Desert Storm (Dawson, 2012). However, peer 
and near peer adversaries have the capability to procure body armor, which can mitigate 
the effectiveness of our small arms and ammunition (DA, 2015a). 
 
 Linear Timeline of Small Arm Improvements. Source: 
Dawson (2012). 
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COA2 balances cost and capability. This COA is a compromise where increased 
lethality is desired, but within an affordable package. COA2 improves the ammunition and 
adapts the M4A1 platform to fire it effectively. It capitalizes on the continuous 
improvements to the M4 platform, but may not provide additional growth potential on an 
aging platform. The M4A1 is a legacy platform and every Soldier is familiar with it; 
therefore, new equipment training and fielding will be much quicker than on a brand-new 
system.  
COA3 represents a dynamic shift in U.S. Army small arms development. It 
completely replaces all individual rifles with a new design, and integrates a new 
ammunition as a validated system. COA3 is the most expensive, but provides growth 
opportunities for decades to come. If COA3 were selected, we recommend a Squad 
Automatic Weapon program run parallel. Running a parallel program would ensure 
delivery of both systems in a relatively close period, and ensure magazines or other 
features could interface or be interchangeable with one another to maintain 
interoperability (DA, 2016a). 
COA4 is a compromise similar to COA2, but does not expect to deliver a viable 
option. Although the ammunition is capable and accurate, weight is a key issue with this 
COA. Polymer ammunition or CT (Cased Telescoped) ammunition could offset the 
additional weight, which could make the weapon much more attractive (Textron, 2017a). 
However, type classifying a new ammunition type would increase the cost of the program 
comparable to COA3. If selected, COA4 would provide the Army with a viable solution 
to the M4A1, which could last for many decades.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The sine qua non of this thesis is the demonstration of an objective decision-
making procedure for potential courses of action. The value-model validates and arranges 
in importance the main elements necessary for maximizing operational effectiveness 
through the combat rifle. This further enables greater understanding on part of the 
decision-maker to decide the most sensible course of action. 
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Based on the notional calibers in each course of action there are a couple 
recommendations we would propose. Overall, the best approach would be to pursue either 
COA2 or 3. Our goal of maximizing the effectiveness of the combat rifle will be achieved 
through two parallel approaches. We can split these approaches based on timeframes; 
short-term would be within 12–24 months and long-term would be greater than 24 months.  
The short-term approach would be a stopgap in order to fill the lethality gap left 
by the 5.56mm caliber. Course of action two is considered our immediate solution. A 
modified M4A1 with a new intermediate caliber ammunition is a quick fix to bridge the 
capability gap. Our solution gives us a counterbalance between both type-classified 
rounds (5.56 and 7.62). Course of action two would drastically increase the lethality and 
accuracy, giving the soldier greater killing potential, but limits the total soldier weight. 
Lastly, maintaining a similar weapon style to the M4 reduces extensive additional 
training usually accompanied with a new weapon design. Thus, likely reducing cost and 
schedule to the program.  
Simultaneously, a new program objective memorandum (POM) should be created 
for FY 19–23 for research and development into a new round. Our long-term solution 
supports course of action three. This approach would take several years to complete the 
development cycle, consisting of independent studies, evaluations and testing. We 
foresee the possibility of course of action three leveraging from the research and 
demonstrations from COA2, but would predominantly be a new, individual project. 
Finally, an acquisition strategy that emphasizes our critical performance factors and 
supports leadership’s goal of increased soldier lethality will provide needed overmatch 
capability for the infantry squad. 
C. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our thesis leaves room for areas of additional research. Our analysis pulls from 
multiple criterion in an effort to draw conclusions to increasing the operational 
effectiveness of the infantryman. A deep dive into one of the individual evaluation 
criterion of lethality, accuracy, mobility, and interoperability would provide greater 
insight into the research area. Greater research on interoperability is needed to study the 
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effects between NATO partners and allies. Further research needs to be conducted on the 
maximum load, in both size and weight, a soldier should carry into battle. Additionally, a 
study on the average amount of ammunition expended during routine combat operations 
compared to direct fire engagements with the enemy should be included to optimize the 
infantryman’s ammunition requirements. Reliability studies for the total system, rifle and 
ammunition, may improve system effectiveness by increasing operational availability. 
Additional studies should be conducted on improved marksmanship training, and the 
effects on the capability of the squad. Each topic could be explored further to provide 
additional methods to increase the effectiveness of the rifleman in the infantry squad.  
An analysis of alternatives (AoA) should be conducted on future capability 
requirements of the infantryman. The AoA will provide decision-makers with credible 
information to assess future capability gaps to maximize the return on investment and 
maximize effectiveness (Air Force Material Command, 2013). Greater effects of how 
science and technology coupled with industry partners can improve the infantryman’s 
primary combat weapon.  
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